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Abstract
This paper proposes an exploration of the methodology of utility
functions that distinguishesinterpretation from representation. While
representation univocally assignsnumberstotheentitiesofthedomain
of utility functions, interpretation relates these entities with empiri-
cally observable objects of choice. This allows us to make explicit the
standard interpretation of utility functions which assumes that two
objects have the same utility if and only if the individual is indif-
ferent among them. We explore the underlying assumptions of such
an hypothesis and proposea non-standard interpretation according to
which objects of choice have a well-de…ned utility although individu-
als may vary in the way they treat these objects in a speci…c context.
We provide examples of such a methodological approach that may ex-
plain some reversal of preferences and suggest possible mathematical
formulations for further research.
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11 Introduction
“The standard rationality hypothesis is that behavior can be represented as
the maximization of a suitably restricted utility function” (Barbera et al.
1998, p. ix). But what constitutes the domain of such a utility function?
It is often informally argued that the domain of utility functions encom-
passes “everything the individual is concerned about”. The entities over
which a utility function assigns numbers are left formally unde…ned. As a
formal model, a utility function represents abstract entities whose relations
do not depend on a concrete interpretation. This is necessary for re‡ecting
the structural properties of these entities and provides the model with its
normative character.
On the other hand, when utility functions are used in practice to describe
or predict an observable behavior, a concrete object of choice must be spec-
i…ed. This is necessary for the model to have some relation with empirical
phenomena. While there is no normative character without abstract entities,
there is no empirical falsi…cation without interpretation.
In the following section, we make explicit these two steps of the method-
ology of utility functions. We refer to interpretation as classifying empirical
objects of choice into abstract classes of objects. Formally speaking, these
abstract classes compose the domain of utility functions. We then refer to
representation as assigning numbers univocally to these classes. The com-
bination of interpretation and representation provides the methodology of
utility functions with both a normative and an empirical character. This
section clari…es these two steps. In particular, it separates representation
from the standard interpretation of utility functions, i.e. that two empir-
ical objects of choice have the same utility if and only if the individual is
indi¤erent between them.
In section 3, we focus on this standard interpretation and on its under-
lying invariance assumptions. Following Sen (1986), we distinguish between
the assumption that similar empirical objects can be treated as identical
(substantive invariance) and the assumption that identical objects lead to
equivalent e¤ects (procedural invariance). We propose to maintain the for-
mer while relaxing the latter, re‡ecting that behavior of individuals may
not be reduced to the properties of the objects of choice. We present a
methodological approach that does not assume procedural invariance and
thus departs from the standard interpretation of utility functions. This ap-
proach is proposed to re‡ect that observed behavior also depends on the way
individuals treat the objects of choice.
In section 4, we propose an analogy and an example to illustrate such a
methodological approach. The analogy discusses the measurement of masses
2with a biased measuring device whose bias is unobservable. While objects
are assumed to have invariant properties (their mass), the bias of the balance
is analogous to the way individuals may treat objects in a decision-making
situation. The decision-making example discusses why an object may be
assigned a lower price than another when evaluated in isolation, while be-
ing preferred when the two objects are directly compared. Such violations
of rationality are well documented, in particular in the application of the
willingness-to-pay method to measure environmental values. Our method-
ology explains them rationally by allowing behavior to depend on the way
individuals treat objects of choice. In this example like in the analogy, em-
pirical observation involves invariant properties of the objects of choice and
varying properties for the process of choice.
In section 5, we suggest two mathematical formulations of such amethod-
ological approach. First, we suggest a modi…cation of the von Neumann and
Morgenstern framework that maintains all original axioms but modi…es the
…rst natural primitive. This preserves representation by an expected utility
function but does not oblige one to maintain the standard interpretation.
Second, we suggest a more general version of the issue in terms of algebraic
structures. Thetheoretical problem whether we can measure procedural vari-
ations through their in‡uence on observable behavior is interesting but not
solved. As our work is exploratory, we open the discussion on these issues.
Finally, section 6 discusses a relatively scattered literature on the issue of
combining interpretation with representation.
2 The Domain and Interpretation of Utility
Functions
In the standard approach to rational behavior, a utility function assigns
numbers to the entities of choice so that an object is chosen over another
if and only if it is assigned a higher number. For example, if an individual
chooses a pear over an apple, then a utility function that represents this
choice assigns a higher utility to the pear than to the apple.
The existence of such a function is established through a representation
theorem which e¤ectively constructs such an assignment procedure while
characterizing it by its uniqueness properties. These theorems of existence
rely on the construction of a one-to-one correspondence or isomorphism be-
tween numbers and the entities to which these numbers are assigned.
In our example, designating the pear by the letter a; the apple by the
letter b, the relation of choice between them by %, and, denoting the utility
3assigned to a by x and the utility assigned to by y, we write
a % b , x > y
where > is the natural relation ordering numbers. However, such a utility
function u is not one-to-one when two objects have the same utility: If we
want to re‡ect in the methodology that two distinct objects may have the
same utility while still establishing the existence of a one-to-one correspon-
dence, we cannot take the objects ofchoice as actually composingthe domain
of the utility function. Constructing a domain over which a utility function
can be formally proved to exist as a one-to-one correspondence between this
domain and numbers is part of the interpretative step.
The standard approach to interpretation assumes that two objects are
assigned the same utility if and only if the individual is indi¤erent among
them. For example, if an individual is indi¤erent between a pear and an
orange, then the pear and the orange will be assigned the same utility. In
this manner, the domain of aone-to-one utility function is constructedby …rst
classifying objects of choice according to the indi¤erence relation. All objects
over which the individual is indi¤erent belong to the same class. When the
indi¤erence relation is assumed to be an equivalence relation, these classes
are equivalence classes. Designating the orange by the letter a0, the relation
of indi¤erence by s, we would then write
a s a0 , a 2 [a] and a0 2 [a]:
Formally, we have constructed the quotient set A= s that consists of disjoint
subsets of A: These subsets are totally ordered by the relation = over the
quotient set A= s : The standard approach to interpretation is summarized
by
a % b , [a] = [b]:
This notation distinguishes = over A= s from % over A to keep in mind
that the former is antisymmetric: [a] = [a0] and [a0] = [a] ) [a] = [a0]; while
the latter is not: a % a0 and a0 % a ) a s a0 ; a = a0: In other words,
there is no possibility to distinguish between two classes that have the same
utility, since these two classes are one and only one identical class. This is
necessary to establish the existence of a one-to-one correspondence between
equivalence classes and numbers, the representation step.
4Representation establishes the existence of a one-to-one correspondence
betweenequivalence classes andnumbers. Because interpretation has already
regrouped all objects of choice that are mutually indi¤erent into one single
class, there is no possibility for the same number to be assigned totwo classes
and the utility function from equivalence classes to numbers is one-to-one.
Representation can be summarized by
[a] = [b] , x > y
with u([a]) = x and u([b]) = y: Formally speaking, the domain of the
utility function u does not consist of the objects of choice but of abstract
equivalence classes. In our example, the utility x assigned to the pear des-
ignated by a is not the utility of a but the utility of an abstract entity to
which a is supposed to belong and that we denoted by [a].
There are therefore two distinct steps in the methodology of utility func-
tions. First, regrouping all objects of choice into abstract equivalence classes
and second, assigning univocally one number to each of these equivalence
classes. In this manner, the methodology of utility functions combines inter-
pretation and representation.
The disentanglement of interpretation from representation leads to ex-
press the methodological statement that an object is chosen over another if
and only if it is assigned a higher utility as being implied by two distinct
equivalences, an interpretive statement and a formal statement
a % b , [a] = [b] (Interpretative Statement)
and
[a] = [b] , x > y: (Formal Statement)
imply
a % b , x > y: (Methodological Statement)










Figure 1: Combining Interpretation with Representation
5Consider a situation in which the apple is chosen over the orange. We
have b Â a0 while x > y contradicting the methodological statement x > y ,
a0 % b: The question is which one of the formal statement x > y , [a0] = [b]
or the interpretive statement [a0] = [b] , a0 % b is violated?
A standard approach would assume the interpretative statement and re-
ject the formal statement. Inother words, the pear, the apple andthe orange
cannot be assigned the utility x;y and x respectively. In particular, the pear
and the orange cannot belong to the same equivalence class.
What if one assumes the formal statement and rejects the interpretive
statement? This would mean that the pear and the orange would belong to
the same equivalence class and would be assigned the same utility but that
the individual may not treat them the same way in the two situations. Dis-
entangling interpretation from representation thus allows one to consider the
possibility that empirical falsi…cation of the methodology of utility function
does not stem from an improper isomorphism between the domain of the
utility function and numbers but from an improper interpretation of what
utility means and relates to empirical observation.
How to express such a possibility for the in‡uence of interpretation on
choice without fallingintoarbitrariness requires to specify distinct underlying
assumptions of interpretation that have remained implicit throughout this
section.
3 Interpretation without Procedural Invari-
ance
Considering that abstract entities can be substituted for empirical objects of
choice without a¤ecting the representationof choice is the standardapproach
to interpretation. It considers that there is no qualitative distinctionbetween
an empirical object of choice and the abstract equivalence class to which it
belongs. But there must be some distinction since two objects of choice
that belong to the same class can be distinguishable as objects of choice.
Therefore, each object of choice possesses properties that are not properties
of the class to which it belongs. The standard approach to interpretation
merely assumes that these properties do not have any empirical in‡uence.
In mathematics, the process by which the quotient set A= s is constructed
is called an abstraction of qualities. Such an abstraction occurs precisely
because the relation between an object of choice and its abstract entity is
not one-to-one. This is another manner to formulate the distinction between
the process of interpretation and the process of representation as one implies
6a loss of information while the other re‡ects all available information in a
richer structure.
The standard interpretation consists in a reduction of choice to well-
de…ned objects of choice so that choice does not depend on the situation in
which the act of choice is performed. In our example, the individual who is
indi¤erent between a pear and an orange is supposed to remain indi¤erent
among a similar pear and a similar orange in a similar situation of choice.
First, it is assumed that the objects of choice are well-de…ned and that they
remain the same. The orange compared with the pear is assumed to be iden-
tical to the orange compared with the apple although the two oranges do
appear in distinct situations of choice. This assumption about the invariance
of the objects of choice a;b;a0::: is called substantive invariance. Second, it
is assumed that the individual who is indi¤erent between the objects also
remains the same. In other words, the pear and the orange are interpreted in
the same manner across situations of choice. This assumption about the in-
variance of the indi¤erence relation s is called procedural invariance because
the two objects are assumed to be treated in the same way. The standard
interpretation thus assumes that similar objects across contexts are identical
(substantive invariance) and that identical objects have similar e¤ects across
situations (procedural invariance), i.e. that similar objects of choice have
similar e¤ects.
However, similar objects across situations may not be identical. A typical
approach consists in indexing objects by the situation in which they appear,
thus de…ning new objects of choice. Di¤erent proposals have been made
in this respect which are well developed and sometimes constitute avenues
of research on their own. A main issue of such a relaxation of substantive
invariance is however to compare these newly de…ned objects. If objects are
distinct across situations and observation takes place in a given situation,
it becomes problematic to formulate observable primitives across situations.
When relaxing substantive invariance, the challenge is to maintain a predic-
tive character for the methodology at the level of individual choice.
Departing from such an approach, we explore a relaxation of procedural
invariance. We assume that similar objects across contexts are identical but
that they may be treated in di¤erent manners by the individual in distinct
situations of choice. Such an approach di¤ers from the preceding one in the
sense that objects of choice remain well-de…ned across situations since they
are assumed to be identical (substantive invariance). It is the intensity of
their relation to the individual who chooses which is not assumed to remain
invariant. In our example, the pear, the apple and the orange are assumed
to remain the same as objects of choice in the di¤erent situations while
the individual is allowed to treat the same orange di¤erently, for instance,
7depending on whether it is compared to a pear or to an apple.
Because each object of choice is well-de…ned across contexts (substantive
invariance), each object belongs to one and only one equivalence class. This
class retains only some of the invariant properties of the object and does not
depend on the process by which an object is treated in a speci…c situation of
choice. It is therefore possible to prove, given adequate properties for these
equivalence classes and the relations among them, the existence and unique-
ness of a utility function that represents a total ordering of these classes.
In this manner, the utility of an object of choice a is interpreted as repre-
senting only those properties of a that are independent of the situation. We
could say that the utility of an object is an absolute measure of its substantive
properties.
Since relaxing procedural invariance amounts to admitting that an object
my be treated di¤erently across contexts, a given object may lead to di¤erent
empirical e¤ects depending on the situation. Inparticular, choice may depend
on the other objects to which it is compared. Besides the properties of the
object represented by its utility, choice is in‡uenced by the process by which
the individual interprets an object relatively to others in a speci…c situation.
In a context in‡uencing more a than b, an object a of utility x may be chosen
over an object b of greater utility y > x: Although the pear, the apple and
the orange are supposed to have a well-de…ned utility as objects of choice,
we do not suppose that, for instance, the orange is treated in the same way
when compared with the pear and when compared with the apple.
In this relaxation of the standard interpretation, we disentangle the prop-
erties of the objects from the properties of the individual, as a subject who
interprets the object and actually carries out the act of choice. Such a relax-
ation introduces more ‡exibility but only at the interpretive level. Because
substantive invariance is maintained, there remains the same structure at
the formal level than with the standard interpretation. Whether such an ap-
proach allows one to better understand observation of empirical phenomena
is now explored through two examples.
4 Observable Behavior without Procedural In-
variance
The distinction between the properties of the objects of choice and the prop-
erties of the subject who carries out choice itself can be illustrated by con-
sidering a black box out of which we can only observe the empirical e¤ects
of choice. This behavioral approach assumes that the inner properties of
8the individual are not directly observable. It is also a standard approach in
natural sciences, a typical example being the measurement of mass. This
section illustrates the observation of behavior when procedural invariance is
not assumed, …rst for themeasurement of mass and then in decision-making1.
We consider a two-arm-balance hidden in a black box. With such a bal-
ance, we observe that an object a is “chosen” over another object b although





Figure 2: Choice in favor of a
Independently of how each object is treated by the balance, it has a
well-de…ned mass and there is an isomorphism between masses and numbers.
However, which object is chosen by the balance does not only depend on
the masses of the objects but also on how these objects are “treated” by the
balance. Because the balance is not assumed to have arms of equal length,
an object with a lower mass may be chosen over another object of greater
mass. Naturally, the de…nition of mass can no longer be expressed as the
property of objects for which the balance is at equilibrium. Such a de…nition
implicitly assumes that each object on the balance is treated in identical
ways: the very assumption we want to relax.
Thede…nition of masses as equivalence classes of objects whose properties
are similar can nevertheless be carried out by an operation of substitution of
one object for another. Such an operation does not involve the two objects
placed on the balance but only one of them, say a; and another one, say a0,
which is not on the balance but which, if placed in substitution of a; would
lead to the same e¤ect than a: In this manner, the class [a] of objects a;a0
regroups all objects of the same mass although two objects of the same mass
may not balance the measuring device because of its bias. Figure3 illustrates
an object a chosen over an object b although the mass of b is greater than
the mass of a:
1The parallel between the measurement of mass and the measurement of utility is
discussed in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) and is indeed a natural one as the
balance is an ancestral analogy for measurement (see Krantz et Al., 1971). One can …nd a





Figure 3: b has a higher mass than a
In this example, the in‡uence of the context on the measuring device is
re‡ected by the position of the fulcrum of the balance. The behavior of the
biasedbalance cannotbe reducedto the massof the objectsthat are placedon
itbut alsodepends on the balance itself. Empirical observation, together with
the assumption that objects of choice have well-de…ned properties, allows us
to appreciate the position of the fulcrum of the balance. How and to which
extent we can properly measure such a position on the sole basis of the
measured masses is an interesting question on which we come back in the
next section. We now illustrate behavior without procedural invariance with
a decision-making example.
In decision making, an interesting class of phenomena violating the stan-
dard interpretation of utility functions occurs when an individual is observed
to choose between two objects and then asked to evaluate each object sep-
arately, for instance by assigning them a price. In some systematic cases,
rational individuals are observed choosing an object a over an object b while
assigning a higher price to b than to a:2 Observing an individual choosing
an object a over an object b can be illustrated with the same …gure than for
the measurement of mass. The individual, as a measuring device, is hidden
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Figure 4: Choice in favor of a.
As for the measurement of mass, relaxation of procedural invariance
necessitates to distinguish between empirical comparison of two objects of
choice and abstract substitution of one class for the object itself. Observ-
ing an individual assigning a price to object a can then be interpreted as a
2Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, and Bazerman (1999) review thesephenomenaand propose
a psychological analysis of these types of preference reversals between joint and separate
evaluation.
10substitution between the object a and the class to which a belongs. Being
absolute, the operationof substitution thus does not involve the other object.
Being relative, choosing one object over another involves both objects and
can be in‡uenced by the propensity of the individual to favor one object over
the other.
A typical type of situation when such reversals occur is when we attempt
to evaluate environmental concerns through pricing, i.e. willingness to pay
techniques. A seminal example being that most individuals confronted with
the choice betweenimproving the air quality intheir town andadding a VCR
to their TV prefer to improve the air quality while they assign a higher price
to the addition of the VCR to their TV (Irwin, Slovic, Lichtenstein, and
McClelland, 1993).
In the interpretation explored here, this would mean that the value of
environmental concerns must not be reduced to the value of the object we
desire to protect but also integrates a procedural value singular to the in-
dividual who chooses. Therefore, reducing environmental concerns to their
willingness-to-pay values would underestimate individuals motivation to act






Figure 5: b has a higher price than a
In this example, pricing di¤ers from choice and the distinction corre-
sponds to the one between substitution and comparison. In such an interpre-
tation, there is no irreducible contradiction in the behavior of the individual
who assigns a higher price to an object that is not chosen. Naturally, abso-
lute evaluation and relative comparison are equivalent under the assumption
that choice is not in‡uenced by the process of choice (procedural invariance).
In the general case, observing a discrepancy between absolute evaluation and
relative comparison informs us about how the objects of choice are treated
by the individual, i.e. about the process of choice. Like for the measurement
of the arms of the balance, the question remains to which extent can we
measure the in‡uence of the process of choice.
115 Mathematical Suggestions
Amathematical characterizationofthemethodology ofutility functions with-
out assuming procedural invariance remains in its exploratory phase. In this
respect, we …rst suggest a formulation based on the axiomatization of ex-
pected utility theory proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern in Games
and Economic Behavior (1953).
The treatment of the methodology of utility functions proposed by von
Neumann and Morgenstern carefully distinguishes the formal and the inter-
pretive steps. The mathematical treatment is strictly restricted to the formal
step of representation. A standard interpretation is presented conceptually
andvarious remarks along the text warnthat such astepis not part ofthefor-
mal treatment. Typically, theauthors donot speak of autility functionper se
but of a correspondence between some abstract entities called “utilities” and
numbers. As pointed out by their following commentators (Marschak, 1950,
Malinvaud, 1952, see also Fishburn, 1989 and Fishburn and Wakker, 1995),
such utilities are equivalence classes, like those denoted above by [a];[b];...
. Axioms apply to these classes and a theorem demonstrates the existence
andthe uniqueness properties of the correspondence between them and num-
bers. Such a formulation helps us to suggest a variation of the von Neumann
and Morgenstern framework that di¤ers only by its interpretation, not by its
formal axioms.
The standard interpretation of the von Neumann and Morgenstern ax-
ioms is expressedthroughone“natural relation”andone “natural operation”
among utilities. The …rst natural relation is denoted by [a] > [b] and reads
“[a] is preferable to [b]": The second natural operation introduces a number
¸ strictly between 0 and 1 and is denoted by “¸[a] + (1 ¡ ¸)[b] = [c]": It
reads “utilities can be combined with probabilities”. The implicit interpre-
tation is that a is chosen over b if and only if [a] is preferable to [b]; that is
a Â b , [a] > [b]; and that a is indi¤erent to b if and only if they have the
same utility, that is a s b , [a] = [b]: Again, such an interpretation is not
part of their formal model.
In order to re‡ect the in‡uence of procedural variations of interpretation,
we suggest to modify the …rst natural relation while maintaining the second
natural operation, the latter corresponding to substantive invariance. The
modi…cation assumes that empirical observation of choice reveals a relation
among weighted equivalence classes. The natural primitives of the framework
become a system of equivalence classes [a];[b];[c] for which we consider:
12First Natural Relation : ®[a] > (1¡ ®)[b];
Second Natural Operation : ¸[a] + (1¡ ¸)[b] = [c];
0 < ® < 1 and 0 < ¸ < 1:
The …rst natural relation can be read as “a is chosen over b": The un-
known number ® is a “hidden bias” that is not given a priori. The known
number ¸ keeps its interpretation as a probability that is objectively given.
The framework allows one to express that “a is chosen over b" while “[b]
is preferable to [a]” suggesting a bound ® >
1
2 revealed a posteriori from
empirical observation of choice. We can indeed keep all the axioms of von
Neumann and Morgenstern combining utilities and the relation among them
having abstracted the process by which these utilities are interpreted, i.e.
the bias ®. As they were expressed by their authors, these axioms are:
1. One and only one of the following holds: [a] > [b];[b] > [a];[a] = [b];
2. Transitivity: [a] > [b] and [b] > [c] imply [a] > [c];
3. Monotonicity: [a] > [b] implies [a] > ¸[a] + (1¡ ¸)[b];
4. Continuity:[a] > [c] > [b] implies ¸[a] +(1 ¡ ¸)[b] > [c] for some ¸;
5. Commutativity:¸[a] + (1¡ ¸)[b] = (1¡ ¸)[b] + ¸[a];
6. Associativity:¹(¸[a] +(1 ¡ ¸)[b]) +(1¡ ¹)[b] = ¹¸[a]+ (1 ¡ ¹¸)[b]:
Although the presence of these axioms ensures the existence of a univo-
cal correspondence with numbers, the uniqueness of such a correspondence
is restricted to the group of positive a¢ne transformations. This means in
particular that the structure does not distinguish between di¤erent represen-
tations that vary with their origin or, equivalently, that we cannot compare
ratios of utilities. As a consequence, even a posteriori, a bias ® can solely be
shown to be less or greater than 1
2; without being quantitatively measured. If
utilities can only be measured on an interval scale, biases can only be ranked
on an ordinal scale.
The formulation of the bias re‡ecting procedural variations of interpreta-
tion as weights on each side of the relation thus suggests a form of indetermi-
nacy (think of comparing 1 unit of the …rst rank with 2 units of the second
rank). Whether such a combination of a quantitative scale (here interval)
with a qualitative scale (here ordinal) together with the partial indetermi-
nacy that results are necessary features of a mathematical formulation that
13combines procedurally biased interpretation with representation remains to
be clari…ed.3
An interesting feature of the von Neumann and Morgenstern formulation
is that it does not use any axiom of independence. As Malinvaud (1952)
explains, such an axiom is part of the standard interpretation and has no
place per se at the abstract level ofequivalence classes (see also Fishburn and
Wakker, 1995). On the other hand, an important e¤ort of research has been
directed to independence because it appears the most commonly violated
axiom of expected utility theory. Consequently, violations of independence
may be a violation of the standard interpretation, not a violation of the
axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern.
The idea we want to re‡ect is that independence holds at the level of
equivalence classes while not at the level of the objects of choice. To for-
mulate such an in‡uence of interpretation between the abstract structure of
equivalence classes and the empirical structure ofobjects of choice, we rely on
the de…nition of an extensive structure (Krantz et Al., 1971). An extensive
structure is a quotient set endowed with a binary operation © and a total
ordering > : An extensive structure satis…es the following properties.
1. One and only one of the following holds: [a] > [b];[b] > [a];[a] = [b];
2. Transitivity: [a] > [b] and [b] > [c] imply [a] > [c];
3. Monotonicity (independence): [a] = [b] i¤ [a] © [c] = [b]© [c];
4. Solvability: [a] > [b] implies [a] = [b] © [c] for some c;
5. Archimedean: n[a] > [b] for some integer n; with 1[a] = [a] and n[a] =
(n ¡ 1)[a] © [a];
6. Commutativity: [a] © [b] = [b] © [a];
7. Associativity: [a] © ([b] © [c]) = ([a] © [b]) © [c]:
When we assume the standard interpretation, these axioms are expressed
in terms of objects of choice a;b;c:::, the weak ordering relation % is sub-
stituted for the total ordering = and the operation ± among objects of A is
substituted for the operation © among equivalence classes of A= s : Using
the standard interpretation to de…ne the ordering among equivalence classes
as a % b , [a] = [b]; we obtain the axioms of an extensive structure.
3An application of such a framework to the Allais paradox and the utility for gambling
can be found in Le Menestrel (2001). An application to procedural concerns in game
theory and a more general discussion can be found in Le Menestrel (1999).
14Our suggestion is thus to impose axioms on the objects of A su¢cient to
construct an equivalence relation t; in general distinct from indi¤erence s;
onA compatible with ±so that thequotient set A= t is anextensive structure
totally ordered by a relation =. We want however to relax the independence
condition. We propose the following sets of axioms for a “semi-monotonic
structure”.
1. One and only one of the following holds: a Â b;b Â a;a s b;
2. Transitivity of Â : a Â b and b Â c imply a Â c;
3. Semi-monotonicity: a % b implies a ± c % b;a % b ±c implies a % b for
all c:
4. Solvability:a Â b implies a % b±c for some c;
5. Archimedean:na Â b for some integer n; with 1a = a and na = (n ¡
1)a ±a;
6. Commutativity:a± b = b ±a;
7. Associativity:a± (b± c) = (a± b) ± c:
With such a structure, we may construct an equivalence relation t on
A so that there exist a total ordering >and an operation © on A= t so
that hA= t;>;©i is an extensive structure. The semi-monotonic structures
hA;Â;±i indeed compose a family of structures, one of which re‡ecting the
standard interpretation. In this special case, we do have a s b , [a] = [b]
and the two relations s and t are identical (with a s b , a ¨ b and
b ¨ a) . In general, the indi¤erence relation s is not necessarily transitive
and di¤ers from the equivalence relation t on A: The question is whether
we can order these semi-monotonic structures so as to measure how much a
given indi¤erence relation s departs from the equivalence relation t : This
amounts to order the empirical relations Â according to their departure from
the standard interpretation. In the case of the biased balance, the question
is whether this allows one to properly measure the bias of the balance from
the objects that are measured by it.
6 Discussion of the Literature
The literature about interpretation and its relationto formal models of utility
functions is relatively scattered. Thestandardinterpretationthattwoobjects
15have the same utility whenever the individual is indi¤erent among them
seems to date back to the 19th century. A historical approach to the notion
of utility can be found in Stigler (1950). For utility functions, the distinction
between interpretation and representation seems to date back to the …rst
formal treatment proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). At
thattime, it hadalready generatedconsiderablecontroversy about the nature
of the domain over which a utility function is de…ned (see e.g. Marschak,
1950; Malinvaud, 1952). With Herstein and Milnor (1953), interpretation
is again subsumed in the exposition of the expected utility representation
theorem, an approach that we can …nd in the more general and modern
theory of representational measurement (Krantz et Al. 1971). This is the
formulation of the standard interpretation we have chosen to expose.
Interpretation, as the relation between empirically observable variables
and their formalization as abstract variables has been acknowledged as a
fundamental assumption of measurement. It is indeed an assumption that is
”ubiquitous throughout all science” (Luce and Narens, 1986, see also Luce
1996). That primitive entities of formal models are hypothetical and thus
not the actual empirical objects of choice remains nevertheless subject to
controversy. A recent clari…cation, due to Aumann, is however explicit :
“In any axiomatic system, the arguments depend crucially on
hypothetical, arti…cial situations that never existed. The essence
of the axiomatic approach is that it works with an entire system,
and with the relations between the objects in it. In particular,
it relates the given, ‘real’, situation to a whole lot of other sit-
uations, all of them hypothetical. This happens constantly—in
Arrow’s (1951) social welfare theory, in the Shapley value (1953),
in Nash’s (1950) bargaining solution, indeed even in Savage’s
(1954) development of probabilities themselves!” (Aumann 1998,
p. 935).
The use of classes as primitives is discussed in de Finetti, in his seminal
paper about subjective probabilities (1937) and later in the two volumes of
the Theory of Probability (1974)4.
An important and speci…c discussion of the role of the standard inter-
pretation can be found in Sen (1986). The distinction between substantive
and procedural invariance is explicitly discussed, as well as the importance
of such forms of invariance for the independence condition in expected utility
4See in particular chapter 6 (1937), chapter 2 (1974) in particular remark 2.4.3 and
appendices 13 and 17 in particular.
16theory, but also with regards to Arrow’s possibility theorem. The argument
is stated in terms of information structure but this is equivalent. Interpre-
tation is seen as drawing a line between relevant information and discarded
information:
”Any principle of choice uses certain types of information and
ignores others. A principle can be understood and assessed in
terms of the information that it demands and the information it
rules out.” (ibid, p. 29)
Another work where the issue of varying interpretations appears is in
(Sounderpandian, 1992). In this multi-criteria approach, interpretation is
seen as the choice of a particular criterion space. The author states that
the order-preserving character of the correspondence between empirical ob-
jects and their multi-criteria interpretation is a matter of “belief”, not of an
axiomatic approach that is empirically falsi…able.
The idea that process preferences may force one to depart from the stan-
dard methodology inherited from natural sciences is evoked in Sen (1997).
The idea of maintaining some substantive invariance while relaxing proce-
dural invariance is related to the notion of process preferences and process
utility developed in Le Menestrel (1999, see also 2001 and references). These
works introduce and model considerations for the processes in order to re‡ect
truly subjective concerns of the individual who acts in a particular context.
It is exploratory in nature since we have been unable to …nd other rigorous
treatments of speci…c process considerations in the literature.
The formulation of the postulate ®u > (1 ¡ ®)v as a modi…cation of
von Neumann and Morgenstern …rst natural relation was …rst proposed in
Le Menestrel (1998). The partial indeterminacy that results from such a
combination of an ordinal and a cardinal measure may seem awkward at
…rst, but not so in light of the search for models that are more open than
formal models and may better re‡ect the nature of rational behavior. In
this respect, the combination of the di¤erent types of hypotheses to give rise
to empirical observation is discussed in Starmer (1999) and outside utility
theory, for instance in Quine (1975).
Unless we have missed sucha work, it remains however to formulate a full
characterization of the system formed by representation and interpretation
without procedural invariance. In this respect, we are following the idea of
relaxing the transitivity of indi¤erence in what we proposed to call semi-
monotonic structures. A review of intransitive indi¤erence can be found in
Fishburn (1970). We are well aware that we do not provide such a charac-
terization but merely suggest some possible directions for research. We wish
to see such a construction in the future.
177 Conclusion
This paper proposes a methodological exploration of utility functions that
attempts to clarify the distinct roles of representation and of interpretation.
Whiletheformerrelies ontheorems provedfromaxioms, thelatter is amatter
of de…nition. For a methodology that claims both a normative character and
some relation with empirical observation, the domain of utility function does
not consist of the empirical objects of choice but of abstract entities that are
related to them through interpretation. The natural way to carry out such
an interpretation is isolated and studied as the standard interpretation of
utility functions.
We suggest that such a standard interpretation of utility functions, in-
herited from the scienti…c methodology primarily developed for the natural
sciences, may not properly consider the inner properties of the individual
who chooses. This may be because scienti…c methodology has been primar-
ily interested in the studies of the properties of objects independently from
the process by which these properties are observable. On the other hand,
individuals who carry out the act of choice are not invariant in the way they
treat objects and their behavior may thus depend on the context of choice
beyond the properties of empirical objects of choice. In other words, empir-
ical violations of the methodology of utility functions may also be explained
by a variance of the properties that are not re‡ected in the standard inter-
pretation. Rather than looking for the “true laws of behavior”, we suggest
to better understand the process by which laws are contextualized and give
rise to empirical observation of behavior.
Our exploration suggests possibilities to re‡ect the in‡uence of the con-
text of choice in models that do not rely on the standard interpretation. We
propose examples of such models and suggest some mathematical treatment.
Further research should better relate such models with current methodolog-
ical approaches so as to better assess their potential interest.
8 References
Arrow, K. J. (1951), Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: John
Wiley and Sons.
Aumann, R. J. (1998), Common Priors: A Reply to Gul, Econometrica 66:
929-938.
Barbera, S., Hammond, P.J., Seidl, C. (eds) (1998), Handbook of Utility Theory:
Volume 1 Principles, Kluwer Academic Press, Boston.
18De Finetti, B. (1937), La prévision : ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives,
Institut Henri Poincaré, Paris, France.
De Finetti, B. (1974), Theory of Probability, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester,
UK.
Fishburn, P. C. (1970), IntransitiveIndi¤erence inPreference Theory: A Survey,
Operations Research 18: 207–228.
Fishburn, P. C. (1989), Retrospective on the Utility Theory of von Neumann
and Morgenstern, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2: 127–158.
Fishburn, P. C., Wakker, P. (1995), The Invention of the Independence Condi-
tion for Preferences, Management Science 41: 1130-1144.
Herstein, I. N., and J. Milnor (1953), An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable
Utility, Econometrica 21: 291-297.
Hsee, C.J., Loewenstein, G.F., Blount, S., and M.H. Bazerman (1999), Prefer-
ence Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluation of Options: A Review
and Theoretical Analysis, Psychological Bulletin 125: 576-590.
Irwin, J.R., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., and G.H. McClelland (1993), Preference
Reversals and the Measurement of Environmental Values, Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty 6: 5-18.
Krantz, D., R. D. Luce, P. Suppes, & A. Tversky (1971), Foundations of Mea-
surement, Volume 1: Additive and Polynomial Representations, Academic
press, New York and London.
Le Menestrel, M. (1998), A Note on Embedding von Neumannand Morgenstern
Utility Theory in a Qualitative Context, INSEAD Working Papers, 52.
Le Menestrel, M. (1999), A Model of Rational Behavior Combining Processes
and Consequences, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation.
Le Menestrel, M. (2001), A Process Approach to the Utility for Gambling,
Theory and Decision 50: 249-262.
Luce, D. R. (1996), The Ongoing Dialog between Empirical Science and Mea-
surement Theory, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5: 5-27.
Luce, D. R. and L. Narens (1987), Measurement Scales on the Continuum,
Science 236: 1527-1532.
Malinvaud, E. (1952), Note on von Neumann-Morgenstern’s Strong Indepen-
dence Axiom, Econometrica 20: 679.
Marschak, J. (1950), Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable
Utility, Econometrica 18: 111-141.
Nash, J.F. (1950), The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 18: 155-162.
Quine, W.V.O. (1975), On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World, Erken-
ntnis 9: 313-328.
19Savage, L. J. (1954), The Foundations of Statistics, New York, 2nd edition
revised and enlarged, 1972, Dover.
Sen, A. (1986), Informationand invariance in normative choice, in Social Choice
and Public Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, pp. 29-55.
Sen, A. (1997); Maximization and the Act of Choice, Econometrica 65: 745-779.
Shapley, L.S. (1953), A Value for n-person Games, in Contributions to the The-
ory of Games, Vol. II, ed. by H. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker. Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, pp. 305-317.
Sounderpandian, J. (1992), Transforming Continuous Utility into Additive Util-
ity Using Kolmogorov’s Theorem, Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Anal-
ysis 1: 93-99.
Starmer, C. (1999), Experiments in Economics: should we trust the dismal
sceintists in white coats?, Journal of Economic Methodology 6: 1-30.
Stigler, G. J. (1950), The development ofutility theory: I, II, Journal of Political
Economy 58: 307-327, 373-396.
von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern (1944), Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ; Second edition 1947,
Third edition 1953.
von Neumann, J. (1951), The General and Logical Theory of Automata, in
Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior: The Hixon Symposium, Lloyd A. Je¤ries
(ed.), John Wiley and Sons, New York.
20